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Abstract In this paper, we present a simple overlapping-generations model with
human capital, pollution, and political corruption to consider problems related to
sustainable growth. In many growth models that incorporate the environment, it is
assumed that there exists an altruistic government that enforces the environmental
policy to maximize the utility of households or social welfare. The conditions for sus-
tainable growth are derived based on this assumption. However, the assumption that
the government implements appropriate policies might be overly optimistic. Bribes,
political donations, and corruption might taint and skew government policy. This pa-
per also considers politico-economic problems. We assume that environmental policy
is determined endogenously through a process of bargaining between the government
and the ?rm (or interest group). Corruption relaxes environmental standards, lowers
the long-run growth rate, and might cause economic stagnation. The long-run growth
rate might become negative if the economy is rife with corruption.
Keywords Political corruption ⊥ Sustainable growth ⊥ Human capital ⊥ Environment
JEL Classi?cation O44 ⊥ P48 ⊥ Q20
1 Introduction
As described in this paper, we present a simple overlapping-generations model with
human capital, pollution, and political corruption to consider problems related to sus-
tainable growth.
D. Ikazaki (B)
Faculty of Human Sciences and Design, Japan Women?s University, 2-8-1, Mejirodai, Bunkyo-ku,
Tokyo, 1128680, Japan
e-mail: ikazaki@fc.jwu.ac.jp
Page 2 of 13 D. Ikazaki
In earlier studies, for example, John and Pecchenino (1994), John et al. (1995),
and Bovenberg and Heijdra (2002) extend the model of Diamond?s (1965) OLG
model and examine the relation between growth and the environment. Stokey (1998),
Aghion and Howitt (1998) also examine the relation between economic growth and
the environment.1 These studies assume that the government is altruistic. Results
obtained using such models suggest that environmental externalities should be inter-
nalized by environmental policies. These studies do not consider politico-economic
problems. Moreover, the assumption that the government implements appropriate
policies might be overly optimistic. Bribes, political donations, and corruption might
taint and skew government policy. Negotiation and compromise between parties
might occur when the government executes policies. Furthermore, not only govern-
ment but also the private sector might use political power to head off the introduction
of strict environmental policies if such policies reduce their pro?ts. 2
In this paper, we will consider how political corruption affects economic growth
and the environment. To highlight the dynamic features of economic activities, we use
the ideas of human capital. Human capital accumulation is one of the most important
factors when we consider long-run growth (Lucas 1988). Some insist that R&D and
innovation exert an important role in long-run growth (Romer 1990; Aghion and
Howitt 1992). We can construct a growth model with R&D and innovation instead
of human capital. However, we can derive similar results even if we introduce R&D.
So, we assume that human capital accumulation becomes an engine of productivity
improvement.
Lopez and Mitra (2000) consider the relation between pollution and growth. The
amounts of donations and pollution level (environmental standard) are determined
endogenously through a process of bargaining between the government and the ?rm.
They show that corruption does not affect the sustainability of economic growth,
although the economy emits more pollution than under the social optimum.
Our model might be interpreted as an extension of Lopez and Mitra (2000).
A salient difference is that we construct a dynamic OLG model rather than a static
model (Lopez and Mitra 2000 construct a static model). By constructing an OLG
model, we can derive the different results from Lopez and Mitra (2000). It can be
demonstrated that corruption relaxes environmental standards and lowers the long-
run growth rate. Results show that the growth rate might become zero or negative if
the government and/or public sector are corrupt to such a degree. Our paper specif-
ically examines the case in which the government colludes with the entrepreneur.
Their utility will increase at the expense of the laborer. In this sense, an implicit
con?ict exists between entrepreneurs and laborers. 3
This paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, the basic setting of this paper is de-
scribed. In Sect. 3, we consider environmental policy. In Sect. 2 and Sect. 3, we do not
take bribes or political donations into consideration. In this case, the long-run growth
1Stokey (1998) and Aghion and Howitt (1998) assume individuals with in?nite longevity. Their models
are not the OLG model.
2See Fredriksson (1997), Aidt (1998). Furthermore, Damania et al. (2003) discuss the linkages between
trade policy, corruption, and environmental policy.
3In Wagner (1998), Jones and Manuelli (2001), and Ono (2005), a con?ict exists between generations.
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rate becomes positive and the environment improves over time if certain conditions
are met. In Sect. 5, problems related to political corruption are introduced. The en-
trepreneurs offer political donations to the government if such donations can increase
their pro?ts to a great extent. However, the government accepts donations if the net
bene?t of taking political donations is positive. We assume that the amount of dona-
tions and the pollution level (environmental standards) are determined endogenously
through a process of bargaining between the government and the entrepreneur. In this
case, the government and the ?rm try to arrive at a cooperative outcome through mu-
tual agreement. We show that this interlocking relation between entrepreneurs and
government lowers the growth rate. The economy might stagnate if the economy is
heavily tainted by corruption.
2 The Model
First, we will analyze the ?nal goods sector. The market for ?nal goods is assumed
to be perfectly competitive. A continuum of ?rms exists. Because the technology
displays constant returns to scale, the precise number of ?rms is irrelevant. For sim-
plicity, we will take their total mass to be one. Following Copeland and Taylor (1994)
and Stokey (1998), we assume that the output of the ?nal good can be written as a
function of pollution and effective input (in our model, human capital). We establish
the production function of the ?nal good as
Yt = AHαt D1⊥ αt , (1)
where Yt is the aggregate output,4 A denotes the productivity parameter, Ht repre-
sents the human capital, and Dt signi?es the pollution. The parameter α is assumed
as 0 < α < 1. Presuming that the government distributes permits uniformly across
?rms and then allows a secondary market in those permits, then those ?rms maxi-
mize their pro?ts at each date, taking the wage rate wt and the price of permit τt as
given. The pro?t of the ?rm is given as
πt = AHαt D1⊥ αt ⊥ wtHt ⊥ τt (Dt ⊥ Dˆt ).
Here Dˆt denotes the numbers of permits that the government supplies to each ?rm.
From the ?rms? pro?t maximization (evaluated market equilibrium), we can obtain
wt = AαHα⊥ 1t D1⊥ αt , (2)
τt = A(1 ⊥ α)Hαt D⊥ αt . (3)
Presuming that the market for permits clears at every moment: Dt = Dˆt for all t .
Then πt = τtDt = A(1 ⊥ α)Hαt D1⊥ αt .5
4Subscript t represents the level in period t throughout this paper.
5See Stokey (1998). In her model, the pro?ts are allocated to households because the ?rms are owned by
households. However, the pro?ts become entrepreneur?s income in our model. We will explain this point
later in detail.
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Let us consider consumers. Generation t is de?ned as the people who are born in
period t . We assume that individuals live for two periods and that each has one child.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the number of each generation is unity.
During the period of youth, individuals accumulate human capital and do not work.
The production function of human capital of generation t is speci?ed as
Ht+1 = BHβt z1⊥ βt , (4)
where B is the parameter and 0 < β < 1. The Ht on the right-hand-side denotes pos-
itive externalities from the human capital of parents (generation t ⊥ 1), and zt is the
educational outlay from the parents. Education cost of young people (generation t)
is paid by their parents (generation t ⊥ 1). Note also that there is no decision making
when they are young.
Each individual can only work during the second period of life. They supply hu-
man capital inelastically, earn a wage, and allocate their income to consumption and
education outlay of their children. It is assumed that the labor market clears at ev-
ery moment. We also assume that utility of the representative individual depends on
consumption and the parents? education expenditure on the child.6 We specify the
expected utility of an individual in generation t (which is represented as UIt ) as
UIt = φ1 log ct+1 + (1 ⊥ φ1) log zt+1 + φ2 logEt+1, (5)
where ct signi?es consumption and zt denotes the education outlay to their children.
Also, φ1 (0 < φ1 < 1) and φ2 (φ2 > 0) are the parameters.
In addition, Et represents the environmental quality. We assume that the dynamic
behavior of environmental quality is speci?ed as
Et+1 = b1Et ⊥ b2Dt, (6)
where b1 > 1 and b2 > 0. The stock of the environmental good has the ability to
renew itself. The rate of renewal is given as function b1Et . However, pollution causes
environmental damage. One unit of pollution spoils b2 units of environmental quality.
Therefore, the net rate of change of the stock of the environment is given as (6).
Let us consider generation t ⊥ 1. They accumulate their human capital in period
t ⊥ 1 and work in period t . Their budget constraint is given as wtHt = ct + zt . In-
dividuals maximize their utility (5) 7 subject to the budget constraint, taking Et as
given. From the individuals? utility maximization, we can obtain
ct = φ1wtHt , (7)
zt = (1 ⊥ φ1)wtHt . (8)
6See Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Galor and Moav (2004), and others.
7Note that the utility of an individual in generation t ⊥ 1 is given as
UIt⊥ 1 = φ1 log ct + (1 ⊥ φ1) log zt + φ2 logEt .
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Next, we will speci?cally examine the entrepreneur. 8 We assume that the utility
of the entrepreneur in period t depends only on the pro?t of the ?rm in period t
(we implicitly assume that entrepreneurs are short lived). We specify the utility of
entrepreneur (UFt ) as






In this section, we consider government policy. A government supplies a permit to
control the pollution. We assume that the government is short-lived and that its ob-
jective is to maximize utility (UGt ), which is de?ned as
UGt = UIt⊥ 1 + UIt + φ3UFt + f (Mt ,Yt ),
where UIt and U
F
t are de?ned in the previous section. Also, Mt signi?es the political
donation and f (Mt ,Yt ) denotes the net bene?t of such a donation. In this section,
we speci?cally examine the case in which Mt = 0. In other words, we analyze the
case in which no political corruption exists. Therefore, the utility of the government
in this is given as UGt = UIt⊥ 1 + UIt + φ3UFt because we assume f (0, Yt ) = 0. In
Sect. 4, we will discuss problems related to political corruption in detail. Parameter
φ3 is the relative weight that the politicians assign to the utility of the entrepreneur.















= (Aα)1+α⊥ αβφ1(1 ⊥ φ1)α(1⊥ β)
⊥ BαD1⊥ αt+1 Hα(1⊥ (1⊥ α)(1⊥ β))t Dα(1⊥ α)(1⊥ β)t , (11)
zt+1 = (1 ⊥ φ1)αYt+1
= Aα(1 ⊥ φ1)Hαt+1D1⊥ αt+1
8Acemoglu et al. (2006) describe a model in which collusion between capitalists and entrepreneurs under-
mines the economy.
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The government in period t looks ahead to the subsequent period because the util-
ity of each young voter depends on ct+1 and Et+1. Following Verbon and Verhoeven
(1992), Meijdam and Verbon (1997), and Ono (2005), this paper assumes rational ex-
pectations and myopic decision making. Rational expectations mean that the short-
lived government can estimate the environmental tax rate in the subsequent period
accurately. Myopic decision making implies that the government does not consider
the impact of current policies on future political decisions. These assumptions imply
that the government chooses a level of pollution Dt , taking the level of pollution in
the next period Dt+1 as given.
Let us consider the impact of the relaxation of environmental regulations (the in-
crease in the supply of the emissions credits). First, it raises the wages and consump-
tion of elderly worker. This effect increases the utility of each old voter. Second, it
drives up pro?ts of the ?rm. This effect improves the utility of each entrepreneur.
Third, it increases the consumption of period t + 1 because human capital in period
t +1 will drive up by such deregulation. This effect increases the utility of each young
voter. Fourth, the environmental quality decreases in period t + 1. Each young voter
will be worse off by this effect.




b1Et ⊥ b2Dt ,
where φ4 ≡ (1 ⊥ α)(1 + φ3 + α(1 ⊥ β)). Then we can express the level of pollution
(denoted as D∗t ) as
D∗t =
b1φ4
b2(φ2 + φ4)Et . (13)
The level of pollution will be higher when individuals do not care about the envi-
ronment (lower φ2), when the regenerative ability of the environment is high (higher
b1), when pollution does not severely affect the environment (lower b2), when the
pro?t rate is high (lower α), and when the relative weight the politicians attach to the
utility of entrepreneur is high (higher φ3). From Eqs. (6) and (13), we obtain
Et+1 = b1φ2
φ2 + φ4 Et ≡ g
∗Et . (14)
Here we de?ne g∗ ≡ b1φ2
φ2+φ4 . The growth rate of Et is g
∗ ⊥ 1 for all t . It is assumed
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Fig. 1 The relationship
between qt+1 and qt
We de?ne Ht
Et















1⊥ (1⊥ α)(1⊥ β)
t . (16)
The dynamic behavior of qt is given as (16). We can show that qt = qt+1 in the
long run because 0 < 1 ⊥ (1 ⊥ α)(1 ⊥ β) < 1 (see Fig. 1). This steady state is unique
and stable. In the steady state, Ht+1
Ht
= g∗. Therefore, the growth rate of the ?nal good
is also given by g∗. The initial values of qt do not play an important role in our
model.
We have not considered the range of Dt until this point. However, as pointed out
by Copeland and Taylor (1994), and Stokey (1998), the contribution of Dt to Yt must
be limited by a ceiling. Suppose that Dt ≤ ⊥dYt . Copeland and Taylor (1994), and
Stokey (1998) make similar assumptions. We assume that ⊥d is relatively large and
the existence of this assumption does not affect our results thus far.
We can show that human capital accumulation is necessary for Yt+1⊥ Yt
Yt
> 0 if we
assume Dt ≤ ⊥dYt . To prove this, suppose that B = 0 and β = 1. Then Ht = H0 for
all t . Suppose also that b1φ2
φ2+φ4 > 1 (see Eq. (14)). In this case the Dt come at ⊥dYt (note
that Dt/ ⊥dYt = Dαt /AHα0 ) and the growth rates of Yt and Et become 0 in the long run.
Human capital accumulation play an essential role in our model when Dt ≤ ⊥dYt . In
this paper, we would like to analyze how political corruption affects growth rate and
environment. So, considering the human capital accumulation is necessary in our
model.
4 Corruption and Political Donation
In the analysis presented above, we did not take political corruption into considera-
tion. Several studies have, however, pointed to the possibility that political problems
are detrimental to economic growth. For example, Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996) ar-
gue that an important role is played by vested interests in determining policies. They
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show that knowledge related to cottage technology sometimes blocks the adoption
of new technology. Ehrlich and Lui (1999) construct a model in which each agent
invests in political capital that affects income distribution. However, investment in
political capital does not contribute to production or productivity increases, it counts
for nothing from a social point of view. Acemoglu et al. (2006) show that interlock-
ing relations among existing low-skilled managers (which can be interpreted as low
productivity industries), capitalists (which can be interpreted as owners of the ?rms
or ?nancial sectors), and government might bring about the delay of changes in the
industrial structure. In these models, corruption tends to affect the steady state of the
economy. However, these models do not consider environmental problems or bar-
gaining between government and the private sector to affect environmental policies.
In this section, we introduce an interest group that offers a political donation to
a government to head off the introduction of a strict environmental policy. Here, we
assume that the entrepreneurs can form an interest group and affect government poli-
cies.9 The net pro?t of entrepreneurs is given as (1 ⊥ α)Yt ⊥ Mt (where Mt denotes
the political donation). Therefore, the utility of representative entrepreneur is given
as log[(1 ⊥ α)Yt ⊥ Mt ]. The utility of the government is de?ned as
UGt = UIt⊥ 1 + UIt + φ3UFt + f (Mt ,Yt ). (17)
In that equation, f (Mt ,Yt ) represents the net bene?t of political donation.10 We as-
sume that f (0, Yt ) = 0 for all Yt . In Sects. 2 and 3, we do not consider political dona-
tions (that is, Mt = 0). If Mt = 0, Eq. (17) is equivalent to UGt = UIt⊥ 1 +UIt +φ3UFt .
It is also assumed that a risk of taking a donation exists because a collusive relation
between the interest group and government might not be supported by voters. We as-
sume that the risk of accepting a donation increases with Yt . Economic development
increases the government?s risk of taking a donation: we assume ∂f
∂M
> 0 and ∂f
∂Y
< 0.
The donation might be regarded as a bribe. In many countries, bribes are illegal in
general. Bribery scandals might engender a change of government. The government
of?cials might be arrested for corruption.
Figure 2 shows a positive correlation between per-capita GDP11 and corruption
perceptions index (CPI) published by Transparency International a non-governmental
organization that monitors corporate and political corruption in international devel-
opment (Transparency International 2009). Corruption is de?ned as the abuse of en-
trusted power for private gain. A higher score of the index indicates less corruption.
The highest (lowest) value is de?ned as 10 (0). The results show that seven out of
every ten countries (and nine out of every ten developing countries) have an index of
9Grossman and Helpman (1994) consider the effect of the interest groups. Acemoglu et al. (2006) consider
the case in which old low-skill managers and capitalists entered into a collusive agreement. Ehrlich and
Lui (1999) discuss the situation in which each agent (individuals or bureaucrat) invests not only in human
capital but also in political capital, which affects income redistribution. Aidt et al. (2008) construct a
model in which the government sets a tax rate to maximize its net bene?t. In his model, raising the tax
rate increases the share that the government can obtain, but it decreases the tax base because some workers
begin to move to the informal sector.
10Downs (1957) assumes that the sole motive behind government policy formulation is the winning of
elections. He did not consider rent-seeking behavior of the government.
11We use data obtained from the World Bank (2011).
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Fig. 2 The relationship
between log (per capita GDP)
and log (corruption perceptions
index)
fewer than 5 points out of 10. We present a plot showing the data of 168 countries in
Fig. 2.
Lambsdorff (2007) shows that an improvement in the CPI by one point increases
average income by 4 percentage points because appropriate institutions increase cap-
ital in?ows and raise productivity. 12
This might imply that rich countries tend to have cleaner government, fair in-
stitutions, and appropriate laws. If so, the risk of taking political donations might
increase with per-capita income because citizens in the developed countries call on
the rectitude of government. To re?ect this point, we assume that the net bene?t of
political donation increases with Mt and decreases with Yt . In this paper, we as-
sume that f (Mt ,Yt ) ≡ γ MtYt . Therefore, the utility of the government is given as
UGt = UIt⊥ 1 + UIt + φ3UFt + γ MtYt .
We assume that Mt and Dt are determined endogenously through a process of
bargaining between the government and the private ?rm. In this case, the government
and the ?rm try to arrive at a cooperative outcome through mutual agreement. Avail-
able to them are a set of outcomes from which they can choose and a disagreement
outcome, i.e., the outcome that is obtained when the government and the ?rm fail to
arrive at an agreement (see Nash 1953 and Osborne and Rubinstein 1990). In this
paper, the bargaining solution is to determine τt and Dt to maximize
	UFt ⊥ 	UGt ,
where 	UFt and 	U
G
t are de?ned as
	UFt = log
[
(1 ⊥ α)AHαt D1⊥ αt ⊥ Mt





	UGt = φ4 logDt + φ2 log(b1Et ⊥ b2Dt) + γ
Mt
Yt





12Data used in Lambsdorff (2007) are the older version. His book was published in 2007. Kurtzman et al.
(2004) use the opacity index (another index that considers the institutions of the economy) and derive
similar results.
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Therein, D∗t is given as (13). The conditions for the maximum are expressed as
(1 ⊥ α)2YtD⊥ 1t









⊥ 	UFt = 0, (20)
⊥ 1





⊥ 	UFt = 0. (21)
Equations (20) and (21) imply
φ4 + γ (1 ⊥ α)2
Dt
= φ2
b1Et ⊥ b2Dt , (22)
which suggests that
D1t =
b1[φ4 + γ (1 ⊥ α)2]
b2[φ2 + φ4 + γ (1 ⊥ α)2]Et, (23)
where D1t is the pollution discharged in this situation. The pollution is more emitted
(and differs from the optimal values) when the marginal bene?t of the political dona-
tion is high (larger γ ) and pro?t rate is high (lower α). In this case, dynamic behavior
of Et is given as
Et+1 = b1φ2





Here g1 ≡ b1φ2
φ2+φ4+γ (1⊥ α)2 . In the steady state, the growth rates of Et , Ht , Yt are the
same and are denoted as g1 ⊥ 1. From Eqs. (14) and (24), we know that g∗ > g1.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. Corruption increases the total
amount of pollution because the government accepts political donations in exchange
for the extra issuance of permits. An increase in pollution bumps the total output
because Yt is positively correlated with Dt (see Eq. (1)). So, corruption allows the
economy to grow faster in period t . However, environmental stock decreases because
Et+1 is negatively correlated with Dt (see Eq. (6)). So corruption has two opposite ef-
fects on Dt+1. First, corruption tends to increase Dt+1 because the government issues
more permits for a given Et+1. On the other hand, corruption in period t decreases
Et+1 and this reduces Dt+1 (see Eq. (23)). The latter negative effects predominate
eventually and the growth rate settles down at a lower steady state rate.
Figure 3 shows the relation between g1 and γ . g1 is correlated negatively with γ .
The growth rate is positive if γ is small, although the growth rate is lower than g∗.
However, g1 becomes smaller than 0 if γ > γˆ , where γˆ is de?ned as follows:
γˆ ≡ (b1 ⊥ 1)φ2 ⊥ φ4
(1 ⊥ α)2 . (25)
The growth rates of Yt , Ht , and Et are given by g1. In fact, g1 becomes positive
(negative) if and only if γ < γˆ (γ > γˆ ). Political corruption engenders economic
Journal of Economic Structures (2014) 3:10 Page 11 of 13
Fig. 3 The relationship
between γ and g
stagnation. Therefore, preventing politicians? or government of?cials? unfair med-
dling in government affairs might be necessary to achieve sustainable growth. Lopez
and Mitra (2000) also assume that environmental policy and the amount of politi-
cal donations are determined by bargaining between ?rms and government. In their
model, corruption is unlikely to preclude the possibility of sustainable growth, al-
though the pollution levels corresponding to corrupt behavior are always above the
socially optimal level. In our model, this is no longer true. The long-run growth rate
might become negative if the economy is rife with corruption.
Hall and Jones (1999) insist that the difference in output per worker and per-capita
income are driven by differences in social infrastructure across countries. They de?ne
social infrastructure as institutions and government policies that determine economic
environment within which individuals accumulate skills, ?rms accumulate capital and
engage in product activity. They conclude that per-capita output is positively related
with social infrastructure. If we can relate uncorrupt government (in this case, γ is
small) to one feature of desirable social infrastructure, then our results might support
the contention of Hall and Jones (1999).
5 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we extend a simple overlapping-generations model to consider the sus-
tainability of growth. Our model includes environmental problems and political cor-
ruption. In many growth models that incorporate the environment, it is assumed that
there exists an altruistic government that enforces the environmental policy to maxi-
mize the utility of households or social welfare. In many previous studies, the condi-
tions for sustainable growth are derived based on this assumption.
In the ?rst part of this paper, we assumed that no political corruption exists. In this
case, output per worker, human capital, and environmental quality grow at a positive
rate in the steady state. Next, we integrated the politico-economic problems into the
model because many earlier studies that examine environment and economic growth
do not address political problems. We analyze the case in which the government ac-
cepts a political donation and relaxes an environmental regulation. We assume that
environmental policy is determined endogenously through a process of bargaining
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between the government and the entrepreneur. This paper showed that the interlock-
ing relations between the government and the interest group lower the growth rate
and might cause economic stagnation. Lopez and Mitra (2000) show that corruption
is unlikely to preclude the possibility of sustainable growth, although the pollution
levels corresponding to corrupt behavior are always above the socially optimal level.
In our model, this is no longer true. The long-run growth rate might become negative
if the economy is rife with corruption.
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